An investment bank decides to have its two stock analysts compete for a prize based on the quality of their annual predictions. The one who submits the most accurate prediction receives a cash prize of $80,000. Each analyst can either (i) invest effort in the prediction or (i) not invest any effort. If both invest effort or both do not invest effort, each has an equal chance of winning the prize (expected value of $40,000). If only one invests effort that analyst is sure to win the $80,000. However, effort comes at a cost of $20,000. The resulting game is represented as: Manager 2 ger1 Effo Manager 1 No Effort Effort 20K, 20K 0,60K No Effort 60K, 0 40K, 40K Suppose that the analysts play this game repeatedly and forever. Every year, each analyst decides whether or not to invest effort in the prediction. If the analysts decide to cooperate using a grim trigger strategy, agreeing to put in no effort as long as the other analyst puts in no effort in every previous period, for what range of discount rates (delta value) is cooperation sustainable?